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THE GROWTH OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY 



By RICHARD OLNEY 



Reprinted from the Atlantic Monthly for March, 1900 



hai^ 



By trnnsfer 

JUL 12 1906 



.05\ 



GROWTH OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY. 



The chai'actei'istic of the foreign re- 
lations of the United States at the 
outbreak of the late Spanish war was 
isolation. The policy was traditional, 
originating at the very birth of the Re- 
public. It had received the sanction of 
its founders — of AVashington preemi- 
nently — had been endorsed by most if 
not all of the leading statesmen of the 
country, and had come to be regarded 
with almost as much respect as if incor- 
porated in the text of the Constitution 
itself. What the policy enjoined in sub- 
stance was aloofness from the political 
affairs of the civilized world in general 
and a strict limitation of the political 
activities of the United States to the 
concerns of the American continents. It 
had been distinguished by two salient 
features which, if not due to it as their 
sole or chief cause, had certainly been 
its natural accompaniments. One of 
them was the Monroe doctrine, so-called, 
directly affecting our rel^itions with for- 
eign Powers. The other was a high 
protective tariff aimed at sequestering 
the home market for the benefit of home 
industries and, though legally speaking 
of merely domestic concern, in practical 
results operating as the most effectual 
of obstacles to intercourse with foreign 
peoples. 

While the Monroe doctrine and a pro- 
tective tariff may be regarded as the 
distinguishing manifestations of our for- 
eign policy prior to the late Spanish 
war, our '• international isolation " has 
had other important consequences which 



should be briefly adverted to. The iso- 
lation policy and practice have tended 
to belittle the national character, have 
led to a species of provincialism and to 
narrow views of our duties and func- 
tions as a nation. They have caused us 
to ignore the importance of sea power 
and to look with equanimity upon the 
decay of our navy and the ruin of our 
merchant marine. They have made us 
content with a diplomatic service always 
inadequate and often positively detri- 
mental to our interests. They have in- 
duced in the people at large an illiberal 
and unintelligent attitude towards for- 
eigners constantly shown in the dispar- 
agement of other peoples, in boastings 
of our own superiority, and in a sense 
of complete irresponsibility for anything 
uttered or written to their injury. This 
attitude of the people at large has natu- 
rally been reflected in their representa- 
tives in public life, while in officials 
brought in direct contact with foreign 
affairs it has often been even greatly in- 
tensified. Apparently, in their anxiety 
not to fall below the pitch of popular 
sentiment, they have been led to strike 
a note altogether beyond it. Hence 
have come, only too frequently and on 
but slight pretexts, violent diatribes 
against foreign governments and gross 
abuse of their peoples and institutions, 
not merely on the hustings, but on the 
floor of the senate or house ; not merely 
by unknown solicitors of votes but by 
public officials in stations so prominent 
as to ffive to their utterances an air of 



2 



GroiotJi of our Foreign Policy. 



real significance. The bad taste and 
worse manners of such utterances from 
such sources, whether in the past or in 
the future, need not be enlarged upon. 
The difference for the future is tliat they 
can no longer be made with impunity 
nor be excused by any professed belief 
in their harmlessness. The cheapest 
politician, the most arrant demagogue, 
can not fail to realize both that, after 
joining the international family of Eu- 
ropean states, the United States can not 
afford to flout its associates, and that for- 
eign governments and peoples can not 
be expected to discriminate between the 
American people and those who repre- 
sent them in appearance however much 
they may misrepresent them in fact. 

Though historians will probably as- 
sign the abandonment of the isolation 
policy of the United States to the time 
when this country and Spain went to 
war over Cuba, and though the aban- 
donment may have been precipitated by 
that contest, the change was inevitable, 
had been long preparing, and could not 
have been long delayed. The American 
people were fast opening their eyes to 
the fact that they were one of the fore- 
most Powers of the earth and should 
play a commensurately great part in its 
affairs. Recognizing force to be the 
final arbiter between states as between 
individuals, and merit however conspic- 
uous and well-founded in international 
law to be of small avail unless supported 
by adequate force, they were growing 
dissatisfied with an unreadiness for the 
use of their strength which made our 
representatives abroad less regarded 
than tliose of many a second or third 
class state, and left American lives and 
property in foreign countries compara- 
tively defenseless. They had come to 
resent a policy and a condition of things 
which disabled the nation from asserting 
itself beyond the bounds of the American 
continents, no matter how urgently such 
assertion might be demanded in the in- 
terests of civilization'and humanity, and 



no matter how clearly selfish interests 
might coincide with generous impulses 
and with what might even be claimed to» 
be moral obligations. They had begun to 
realize that their industrial and commer- 
cial development should not be checked 
by limitation to the demands of the 
home market but must be furthered by 
free access to all markets ; that to se- 
cure such access the nation must be 
formidable not merely in its wants and 
wishes and latent capabilities but in 
the means at hand wherewith to readi- 
ly exert and enforce them ; and, as it 
could not hope to compass its ends 
without a sympathizer or friend among 
the nations, that it was imperative the 
United States should be ready to take 
any concerted action with other nations 
which its own special interests might 
reqiiire. In short, when our troubles 
with Spain came to a head, it had, it 
is believed, already dawned upon the 
American mind that the international 
policy suitable to our infancy and our 
weakness was unwoi'thy of our maturity 
and our strength ; that the traditional 
rules regulating our relations to Europe, 
almost a necessity of the conditions pre- 
vailing a century ago, were inajjpHcable 
to the changed conditions of the present 
day ; and that both duty and interest 
required us to take our true position in 
the European family and to both reap 
all the advantages and assume all the 
burdens incident to that position. There- 
fore, while the Spanish war of 1898 is 
synchronous with the abandonment of 
its isolation policy by the United States, 
it was not the cause of such abandon- 
ment and at the most only hastened it 
by an inconsiderable period. So, while 
the Spanish war ended in the acquisi- 
tion of Cuba by the United States, that 
result was neither unnatural nor surpris- 
ing, but something sure to occur, if not 
in the year 1898, before many yeai-s, 
and if without war, then by a cession 
from Spain more or less compulsory in 
character. It may be thought at first 



Grotvth of' our Foreign Policy. 



blush that to speak of " the acquisition 
of Cuba by the United States " as a fact 
accomplished is inaccurate. But the ob- 
jection is technical and the expression 
conveys the substantial truth, notwith- 
standing a resolution of Congress which, 
ill-advised and futile at the time of its 
passage, if now influential at all, is sim- 
ply prejudicing the interests of Cuba 
and the United States alike. No sucli 
resolution can refute the logic of the 
undisputed facts or should be allowed 
to impede the natural march of events. 
To any satisfactory solution of the Cu- 
ban problem it is vital that Cuba's 
political conditions should be perma- 
nently settled. The spectacle now ex- 
hibited of a Pi-esident and his Cabinet 
sitting in Washington with an appointee 
and sort of imitation President sitting 
with his Cabinet in the Antilles must 
have an end, the sooner the better, and 
will end when Congress ceases to ignore 
its functions and makes Cuba in point 
of law what she already is in point of 
fact, namely, United States territory. 
Were there to be a plebiscite on the 
subject, such a consummation would be 
favored by practically the entire body 
of the intelligence and wealth of the 
Island. Until it is reached, capital will 
hesitate to go there, emigration from this 
country will be insignificant, and Cuba 
will fail to enter upon that new era of 
progress and development, industrial, 
political, and social, which is relied upon 
to justify and ought to justify the substi- 
tution of American for Spanish control. 
If our peculiar relations to Cuba be 
borne in mind — if it be remembered 
that the United States has always treat- 
ed that Island as part of the American 
continents, and, by reason of its prox- 
imity to our shoi'es and its command of 
the Gulf of Mexico, as essential to our 
security against foreign aggression — if 
it be realized that during our entire na- 
tional existence foreign Powers have had 
clear notice that, while Spain would be 
allowed to play out her hand in the 



Island, no other Power than the United 
States would be permitted to absorb it, 
it will be at once admitted that neither 
the Spanish war nor its inevitable re- 
sult, our acquisition of Cuba, compelled 
or is responsible for the relinquishment 
by the United States of its isolation poli- 
cy. That relinquishment — the substi- 
tution of international fellowship — the 
change from passive and perfunctory 
membership of the society of civilized 
states to real and active membership — 
is to be ascribed not only to the various 
causes already enumerated, but above 
all to that instinct and impulse in the 
line of national growth and expansion 
whose absence would be a sure symptom 
of our national deterioration. For it is 
true of states as of individuals — they 
never stand still, and if not going foi'- 
ward, are surely retrogressing. This 
evolution of the United States as one of 
the great Powers among the nations has, 
however, been accompanied by another 
departure radical in character and far- 
reaching in consequences. The United 
States has come out of its shell and 
ceased to be a hermit among the nations, 
naturally and properly. What was not 
necessary and is certainly of the most 
doubtful expediency is that it should at 
the same time become a colonizing Pow- 
er on an immense scale. The annexa- 
tion of the Hawaiian Islands need not 
now be taken into account and is to be 
justified, if at all, on peculiar grounds 
not possible to exist in any other case. 
But why do we find ourselves laboring 
under the huge incubus of the Philip- 
pines ? There has always been a popu- 
lar impression that we drifted into the 
Philippines — that we acquired them 
without being able to help ourselves and 
almost without knowing it. But that 
theory — however in accord with the 
pi'obabilities of the case — that theory, 
with all excuses and palliations founded 
upon it, is in truth an entire mistake. 
It is certain and has recently been de- 
clared by the highest authority that, hav- 



Groioth of our Foreign Policy. 



ing acquired by our arms nothing but a 
military occupation of the port and city 
of Manila, we voluntarily jnxrchased the 
entire Philippine archipelago for twenty 
millions of dollars. The power of the 
government to buy — to acquire territo- 
ry in that way — may be, indeed prob- 
ably should be and must be admitted. 
Its exercise, however, must be justified 
by something more than the fact of its 
possession. Such exercise must be shown 
to have been demanded by either the 
intex-ests or the duty of the United States. 
What duty did the United States have 
in the premises ? The question of duty 
comes first — because, if there were any, 
it might be incumbent on us to under- 
take its performance even at the sacrifice 
of our interests. What, then, was the 
call of duty that coerced us to take over 
the Philippine archipelago — that com- 
pelled us to assume the enormous burden 
of introducing order and civilization and 
good government into uncounted, if not 
uncountable, tropical islands lying thou- 
sands of miles from our coasts — that 
bound us to enter upon the herculean task 
of leading into the paths of " sweetness 
and light " many millions of people of 
all colors from the deepest black to the 
lightest yellow, of tongues as numerous 
and hopelessly diverse as those of the 
builders of the tower of Babel, and of all 
stages of enlightenment or non-enlighten- 
ment between the absolutely barbarous 
and the semi-civilized ? It used to be 
said that our honor was involved — that 
having forcibly overthrown the sover- 
eignty of Spain in the archipelago, we 
were bound in lionor not to leave it dere- 
lict. But, as already noted, that pi*opo- 
sition is completely disposed of by the 
official admission that we never held by 
conquest anything more than the city and 
harbor of Manila and that our title to 
everything else rests on purchase. The 
same admission disposes of the specious 
argument, a cheap resource of demagogy, 
that where the flag has once been hoist- 
ed it must never be taken down. But 



if, as iiQw authoritatively declared, it had 
never been hoisted over more than the 
city and port of Manila, no removal of 
it from the rest of the archipelago was 
possible in the nature of things. If 
not bound in honor to buy the Philip- 
pines, how otherwise were we bound ? 
A distinguished senator, on his return 
from Ensjland last summei', beingr asked 
what was thought there of our Philip- 
pine imbroglio, is said to have answered 
that the English were laughing in their 
sleeves at us. They 'were not laugh- 
ing, it may be assumed, at our disasters. 
They wwe not merry, unquestionably, 
over our waste of millions of treasure 
and over our sacrifice through battle and 
disease of thousands of valuable lives. 
They would naturally rather applaud 
than scoff at our ambitions in the line 
of territorial extension. But British risi- 
bles, not too easily excited under any 
circumstances, must indeed have been of 
adamant not to be moved by the justifi- 
cations for our predicament vociferously 
urged by politicians and office-holdei^ 
now especially prominent before the pub- 
lic. Does it appear or is it argued that 
the Spanish war was unnecessary — that 
the pear was ripe and ready to fall into 
our laps, without war and the killing of 
the reconcentrados, could we only have 
kept our heads and our tempers — that 
with a fair degree of tact and patience 
and common sense the Philippines might 
have been pacified — the astonishing an- 
swer is declamation about the beauties 
of the "strenuous life," the latest euphe- 
mism for war ! Does it appear or is 
it claimed that no trade we are likely 
to have with the Philippines and China 
together is likely to compensate us for 
the enormous cost of first subjugating 
and afterwards defending and govern- 
ing the Islands — an equally remark- 
able reply is that any such objections 
are shameful and unworthy ; that we 
have a duty in the premises ; and that 
whatever our wishes, or our interests, 
or our sacrifices, we are under solemn 



Growth of our Foreign Policy. 



obligation to carry the blessings of good 
government and civilization to the in- 
habitants of the Philippine archipelago ! 
It is not easy to conceive of anything 
more baseless and more fantastic. As 
if war, under whatever alias, were not 
still the " hell " it was declared to be 
not by any appi'entice to the trade but 
by one of the great commanders of the 
age ; as if charity should not begin at 
home and he who fails to make those of 
his own house his first care were not 
worse than the heathen ; as if New Yoi'k 
and Boston and all our cities did not 
have their slums and the country at large - 
its millions of suffering and deserving 
poor whose welfare is of infinitely great- 
er importance to us than that of the 
Kanakas and Malays of the Orient, and 
whose relief would readily absorb all the 
energies and all the funds the United 
States can well spare for humane enter- 
prises. No wonder our British kinsmen 
guffaw at such extraordinary justifica- 
tions of our Pliilijipine policy. The Brit- 
isher himself is as far as possible from 
indulging in any such sickly sentimental- 
ity. He quite undei'stands that the first 
and paramount duty of his government 
is to himself and his fellow-subjects ; 
that, as regards all outside of the Brit- 
ish pale, whatever his government may 
do in the line of benevolence and charity 
is simply incidental and subsidiary. He 
fully realizes that if territory is annexed 
or control assumed of an alien race, it 
must be justified to the British nation 
by its promotion of the interests of the 
British Empire. If the transaction can 
be justified to the world at large as also 
in the interest of a progressive civiliza- 
tion — and it must be adi^tted that it 
often can be — so much the better. But 
the British policy is first and last and 
always one of selfishness, however supe- 
rior in point of enlightenment that self- 
ishness may be. It is so of necessity 
and in the nature of things — as must be 
the policy of every other great Power. 
None can afford not to attend strictly to 



its own business and not to make the 
welfare of its own people its primary ob- 
ject — none can afford to regard itself as 
a sort of missionaiy nation charged with 
the rectification of errors and the redress 
of wrongs the woi-ld over. Were the 
United States to enter upon its new in- 
ternational role with the serious purpose 
of carrying out any such theory, it would 
not merely be laughed at but voted a nui- 
sance by all other nations — and Created 
accordingly. 

If not bound to buy the Philippines 
by any considerations of honor and duty, 
was it our interest to buy them ? 

Colonies may be greatly for the ad- 
vantage of a nation. If it have a limit- 
ed home territory and a redundant pop- 
ulation, distant dependencies may afford 
just the outlet required for its surplus 
inhabitants and for the increase and 
diversification of its industries. It is 
manifest that no considerations of that 
sort are applicable in the case of the 
United States and the Philippines. Were 
our population ever so dense, it could 
not be drained off to the Philippines 
where the white laborer can not live. 
But the United States, far from having 
a crowded population to dispose of, has 
an enormous area of vacant land which 
for generations to come will be more 
than adequate to all the wants of its 
jjeople. Our purchase of the Philippines 
can be justified, then, if at all, only by 
its effect in creating or extending trade 
and commerce with the Philippines and 
with China. What can be said for the 
purchase from that point of view ? 

On this subject the thick and thin 
supporters of the administration seek to 
dazzle our eyes with the most glowing 
visions. A soil as fertile as any on the 
globe needs but to be tickled with the 
hoe — to use Douglas Jerrold's figure — 
to laugh with abundant harvests of all 
the most desired tropical fruits. Min- 
erals of all kinds are declared to abound 
everywhere — virgin forests of the 
choicest woods to be almost limitless in 



6 



Groivth of our Foreign Policy. 



extent — while as for coal, it is solemn- 
ly asserted to be even dropping out of 
the tops of mountains. Nothing, in 
short, is too good or too strong for the 
defenders of the Philippine purchase to 
say of the natural resources of the Phil- 
ippines, and with declamation on that 
single point, they usually make haste to 
drop the subject. They do not stop to 
tell us what we are to sell to a commu- 
nity whose members live on the sponta- 
neous growth of their mother earth, and 
clothe themselves very much as did our 
first parents after the expulsion from 
Eden. They fail to tell us, further, 
with what labor the vaunted resources 
of the Islands are to be exploited, since 
the white laborer can not work there 
and the native will not. Shall we take 
the ground that what is bad for the 
United States is yet good enough for the 
Philippines and so legalize coolie immi- 
gration from China? Or, being just re- 
covered from the bloodiest war of our 
time waged for the national life but 
caused and inspired by hatred of negro 
slavery, shall we now follow up our 
Philippine investment by adopting the 
system of quasi-slavery known as " In- 
dentured Labor " and hire " black-bird- 
ers," as they are called in Samoa, to 
"recruit " laborers in India or to steal 
or cajole negroes from among the out- 
lying islands of the Pacific ? Upon these 
as upon all the other difficulties which 
lead, not orators nor politicians, but busi- 
ness men and experts on the subject to 
declare that the Philippine trade will 
never repay the cost of acquisition, the 
friends of the Philippine purchase are 
discreetly silent. They do not, however, 
rest their case wholly, nor as a rule, 
even to any great extent, on the Philip- 
pine trade alone. They point to China 
— to its swarming millions and the im- 
mense markets which the breaking down 
of Chinese traditional barriers will af- 
ford to the nations of the West — and 
they triumphantly assert that here is to 
be found the more than sufficient justifi- 



cation for the Philippine purchase. The 
claim would be much exaggerated even 
if the Philippines could give us the en- 
tire Chinese market instead of simply 
letting us join in a neck and neck race 
for a share of it with every country of 
Europe. Be it assumed, however, that all 
that is said about the value of commerce 
with China — be it assumed, indeed, for 
present purposes that all that is said 
about the value of both the Philippine 
and the China trade — is fully borne 
out by the facts — what follows ? That 
we were compelled to buy the Philip- 
pines in order to get our share ? That 
is so far from being evident — is indeed 
so far from what seems to be the plain 
truth — that it is not too much to assert 
quite positively that we should have been 
in a better position to command our share 
of the Philippine and Chinese trade 
without the Philippines than with them. 
Chinese territory, it may be taken for 
granted, is not coveted by the most ad- 
vanced of American jingoes. What they 
may come to in the future no one can 
predict, of course, but as yet no party and 
no section of any party in this country 
claims that, for the purj30ses of trade 
with China or for any other purpose, 
we should be one of the Powers to de- 
mand and extort territory or territorial 
rights in China. The efforts of the 
United States are limited — and wisely 
limited — to seeking for its ships and its 
merchants equal opportunities in China 
— to promoting in Chinese waters and 
on Chinese soil the policy known as the 
" open door." Is, then, the position of 
the United States, as insisting upon the 
" open door " in China, strengthened or 
weakened by its having the Philippine 
Islands on its hands ? The administra- 
tion has apparently memorialized Euro- 
pean Powers on the ground of our legal 
rights to the "open door" under our 
treaties with China. But, if those Pow- 
ers have been rightly appealed to, it 
must be because they have become par- 
amount in China — because by conquest 



Groroth of onr Fore'ujn Policy. 



or unrestricted cession they have dis- 
placed China's sovei'eignty and substitut- 
ed their own — in which case any obser- 
vance by them of our treaty stipulations 
with China becomes matter of grace and 
favor purely. Our appeals are said to 
have brought satisfactory " assurances." 
But such " assurances " can hai'dly be 
regarded as definite obligations, nor as 
more than expi*essions of present views 
and intentions, nor as being more un- 
changeable than the views and intentions 
themselves. In these commercial days, 
governments do not give something for 
nothing — if they accord trade privi- 
leges, it is for value received or expect- 
ed — and the official representative of 
the Czar in this country has already 
risen to explain as follows: "The ex- 
traordinary privileges for the importa- 
tion of machinery and breadstuffs into 
Russia will of course not last forever. 
Americans understand the principle of 
the protective tariff too well to make 
lengthy explanation necessary. When 
Russian industries reach a stage where 
reasonable encouragement will produce 
good results, of course the necessary pro- 
tection will be extended." We should 
indeed be credulous if we were to be- 
lieve that, when the time comes which 
the Russian Ambassador anticipates, 
either any " assurances " now given will 
prevent such customs regulations by Rus- 
sia as her own interest requires, or will 
lead her to distinguish for our benefit 
1)etween her Chinese possessions and her 
territory generally. AVe can count upon 
the maintenance of the "open door" in 
China, therefore, only if we can influ- 
ence the Powers concerned in one of 
two ways — by making it their interest 
to grant it through reciprocal conces- 
sions on our own part or by a manifest 
readiness to back our demand for it by 
such physical force as they will not care 
to encounter. To the successful use of 
the first method, our Philippine posses- 
sions are a serious drawback if not an 
insuperable obstacle. If we claim the 



"open door" of the Powers dominating 
China, how are we to deny it to them 
in our own dependencies and especially 
in the Philippines ? One inconsiderate 
foreign office is already said to have an- 
swered us by asking our intentions as to 
the Phili2:)pines, and might, in view of 
the alleged vast extent of the Chinese 
markets, have not impertinently inquired 
if some other American territory would 
not also be opened to free trade. If 
the Philippines rather embarrass than 
help us in securing the " open door " in 
China by amicable arrangement, what 
is to be said upon the point of their en- 
abling or aiding us to enforce it ? We are 
told that they place us in the " front 
door-yard " of the " Orient " and, from 
that graphic figure of speech, are de- 
sired to infer and believe that the entire 
Philippine archipelago was and is neces- 
sary to our possession of power and au- 
thority in the Pacific. But it might as 
well be claimed that Gibraltar did not 
suffice for England's control of the Medi- 
terranean and that for that purpose *he 
ought to have in addition a large slice of 
Africa or of Spain. Assume to be true 
all that is said of the value of trade with 
China — assume that, if we can not get 
our share in any other way, we ought to 
be in a position to get it by force — as- 
sume that, to use such force or be pre- 
pared to use it, we must have a large 
navy which must be enabled to supply 
itself with coal — assume all this — and 
there is still no satisfactory proof that 
we had any occasion to buy the en- 
tire Philippine archipelago. Nothing, 
indeed, follows except that it would have 
been wise for us to acquire such part of 
the Philippines as was necessary to give 
us proper coaling stations and an ade- 
quate naval base. If that and that only 
had been done, we should have been in 
a better position to secure and protect 
our interests in trade with China than 
we are with the Philippine load on our 
backs. We should have been more like- 
ly to reach our end by friendly negotia- 



8 



Growth of our Foreign Policy. 



tions because we should have seemed 
less aggressive ; should have excited to 
a less degree the jealousies and the rival- 
ries of foreign peoples ; and should have 
had less difficulty with our anomalous 
attitude in demanding free trade with 
the dependencies of other countries while 
hampering free trade with our own by 
the severest restrictions. We should also 
have been stronger for accomplishing 
our object by force because, as compared 
with a proper naval base in the Philip- 
pines adequately supplied, fortified, and 
garrisoned, our possession of the entire 
Philippine group is a source of weak- 
ness rather than of strength. The Islands 
offer innumerable points of attack to any 
Power with a hostile animus. Yet we 
must always be prepared to defend each 
and all of them at all hazards and with 
all our resources — the Islands are ours 
as much as Massachusetts or Illinois — 
and not to maintain the integrity of 
American soil everywhere and against 
all comers, would deservedly expose us 
to aniversal contempt and derision. It 
follows, that whereas our trade with 
China would have been amply secured 
and protected by the enlarged navy we 
must and should have under any circum- 
stances supplemented by an adequate 
naval base and coaling stations in the 
Philippines, the taking over of the whole 
archipelago enfeebles us for all pur- 
poses — by the immense, remote, and 
peculiarly vulnerable area we must de- 
fend ; by the large permanent army we 
must transport and maintain, not merely 
to prevent and deter aggression from 
without, but to hold down a native popu- 
lation thoroughly disaffected and resent- 
ful of the tactless and brutal policy hither- 
to pursued towards it ; and by the tre- 
mendous drain on our resources whicli 
the civil and military administration of 
the Islands will inevitably entail. 

Thus, adequate grounds for the pur- 
chase of the Philippines by the United 
States, for considering it to be demand- 
ed by duty, or honor, or interest, are not 



apparent. Nevertheless, however bad 
the blunder, the possession of sufficient 
legal power to commit us on the part of 
those in charge of the government for 
the time being must be conceded. Whe- 
ther we want the Philippines or not, and 
whether we ought to have them or not, 
that we have got them is something not 
to be denied. They are our " old man of 
the sea " — with this difference in favor 
of Sindbad, that by intoxicating his mon- 
ster he managed to get rid of him. It 
is tolerably certain there is no such way 
out for us, and that if intoxication is any 
element in the case at all, it must have 
supervened at the time our " old man 
of the sea " was foisted upon us. 

The thing is done. We were an Amer- 
ican Empire purely — and the United 
States, in taking its seat at the interna- 
tional council table and joining in the 
deliberations of civilized states, might 
have been in an ideal position, combin- 
ing the height of authority and prestige 
with complete independence and with a 
liberty of action which would enable us 
to always make our own interests our first 
care and yet allow us, when permitted 
by those interests, to say a timely word 
or do a timely deed wherever and when- 
ever the cause of civilization seemed to 
require. This possible — this natural 
— ideal position, an exercise of the treaty 
])ower by the national executive and 
senate has deprived us of. We are no 
longer an American Empire simply — 
we are become an Asiatic Empire also, 
environed by all the rivalries, jealousies, 
embarrassments, and perils attaching to 
every Power now struggling for com- 
mercial and political supremacy in the 
East, and starting the second centuiy of 
national existence with all our energies 
and resources, which have proved no 
more than adequate to the good govern- 
ment and civilization of the white and 
black races of North America, pledged 
and mortgaged for the like services to 
be rendered by us to seven or eight mil- 
lions of the brown men of the tropics. 



Growth of our Foreign Policy. 



9 



Nevertheless, as already stated, we are 
committed — the Philijjpines are ours — 
how we shall deal with them is a do- 
mestic question simply — so that, in this 
connection and at this time, what re- 
mains to be considered is the effect of 
this exact situation upon the future of our 
foreign relations. The United States 
now asserting itself not only as one of 
the great Powers of the world but as a 
Power with very large Asiatic depend- 
encies — what consequent changes in 
respect of its foreign relations must rea- 
sonably be anticipated ? 

It goes without saying that the United 
States cannot play the part in the world's 
affairs it has just assumed without equip- 
ping itself for the part with all the in- 
strumentalities necessary to make its will 
felt either through pacific intercourse and 
negotiation or through force. Its diplo- 
matic agencies must, therefore, be great- 
ly enlarged, strengthened, and improved, 
while a powerful navy up to date in all 
points of construction, armament, gen- 
eral efficiency and readiness for instant 
service, becomes of equal necessity. 
Our Philippine possessions will not mere- 
ly emphasize the urgent occasion for 
such innovations. They will make the 
innovations greater and moi-e burden- 
some while at the same time compelling- 
others which we could have done with- 
out. The Philippines inevitably make 
our navy lai"ger than it would have to 
be without them — they inevitably en- 
hance the extent and the quality and the 
cost of the diplomatic establishment with 
wliich we must provide ourselves. But 
besides aggi'avating the weight and the 
expense of the necessary burdens in- 
volved in our assuming our true place 
among the nations, the Philippines add 
burdens of their own. There will be no 
I'espectable government of the Islands 
until they are furnished with a large 
force of highly educated and trained ad- 
ministrators. Further, as already ob- 
served, were it not for the Philippines, 
we might have escaped the curse of any 



very large additions to our regular stand- 
ing army. But the equipment required 
for our new international role need not 
be discussetl at any length. We must 
have it — Wie need will be forced upon 
us by facts the logic of which will be ir- 
resistible — and however slow to move 
or indisposed to face the facts, the na- 
tional government must sooner or later 
provide it. It is more important as well 
as interesting to inquii'e how the new 
phase of our foreign relations will affect 
the princijjles regulating our policy and 
conduct towards foreign states. 

In dealing with that topic, it should 
be kept in mii;!^' that membership of the 
society of civiyzed states does not mean 
that each member has the same rights 
and duties as respects every subject-mat- 
ter. On the contrary, the immediate 
interests of a nation often give it rights 
and charge it with duties which do not 
attach to any other. By common con- 
sent, for example, the right and duty of 
stopping the Spanish-Cuban hostilities 
were deemed to be in the United States 
on account of a special interest ai'ising 
from Cuba's proximity to the United 
States and from the intimate relations of 
all sorts inevitably growing out of that 
proximity. So, though England is an 
insular Power, her home territory lies 
so near the European continent that the 
internal affairs of the European states di- 
rectly interest her almost as much as if 
the English Channel were solid land. On 
the other hand, while the United States 
as regards Europe in general may also be 
regarded as an insular Power, its re- 
moteness and separation from Europe by 
a great expanse of ocean make its inter- 
est in the internal affairs of European 
states almost altogether speculative and 
sentimental. Abstention from interfer- 
ence in any such affairs — in changes of 
dynasty, forms of government, altera- 
tions of boundaries and social and do- 
mestic institutions — should be and must 
be the rule of the United States for the 
future as it has been in the past. 



10 



Growth of our Foreign Policy. 



Again, as between itself and the states 
of Europe, the primacy of the United 
States as respects the affairs of the Amer- 
ican continents is a principle of its for- 
eign policy which will no doubt hold good 
and be as firmly asserted in the future 
as in the past. A particular application 
and illustration of the principle are found 
in wliat is known as the Monroe doctrine, 
which will be as important in the future 
as in the past ; our uncompromising adher- 
ence to which we have lately proclaimed 
to all the world ; and which may and 
should command general acquiescence 
since it requires of Europe to abstain 
from doing in Americf^nothing more 
than we should and mu* abstain from 
doing in Europe. 

It is to be remembered, however, that 
no rule of policy is so inflexible as not to 
bend to the force of extraordinary and 
anomalous conditions. During the Na- 
poleonic wars, the United States wisely 
though with the utmost difficulty pre- 
served a strict neutrality. But our weak- 
ness, not our will consented — we were 
the passive prey of both belligerents — 
publicly and privately we suffered the 
extreme of humiliation and indignity — 
and it is safe to say that were the career 
of the first Napoleon to approach or even 
threaten repetition, not merely sentiment 
and sympathy but the strongest consid- 
erations of self-preservation and self-de- 
fense might drive us to take sides. It is 
hardly necessary to add that the status 
of the United States as an Asiatic Power 
must have some tendency to qualify the 
attitude which, as a strictly American 
Power, the United States has hitherto 
successfully maintained towards the 
states of Europe. They are Asiatic Pow- 
ers as well as ourselves — we shall be 
brought in contact with them as never 
before — competition and irritation are 
inevitable and controversies not improb- 
able — and wlien and how far a con- 
flict in the East may spread and what 
domestic as well as foreign interests and 
policies may be involved, is altogether 



beyond the reach of human sagacity to 
foretell. 

Subject to these exceptions — to ex- 
ceptions arising from extraordinary and 
anomalous European conditions and 
from difficulties into which the United 
States as an Asiatic Power may draw 
the United States as an American Pow- 
er — subject to these exceptions, our 
new departure in foreign affairs will re- 
quire no change in the cardinal rules al- 
ready alluded to. Hereafter as hereto- 
fore, our general policy must be and will 
be non-interference in the internal af- 
fairs of European states — hereafter as 
heretofore we shall claim paramountcy 
in things purely American — and here- 
after as heretofore we shall antagonize 
any attempt by an European Power to 
forcibly plant its flag on the American 
continents. It can not be doubted, how- 
ever, that our new departure not merely 
unties our hands but fairly binds us to 
use them in a manner we have thus far 
not been accustomed to. We can not as- 
sert ourselves as a Power whose interests 
and sympathies are as wide as civiliza- 
tion without assuming obligations coi're- 
sponding to the claim — obligations to be 
all the more scrupulously recognized and 
pei'formed that they lack the sanction of 
physical force. The first duty of every 
nation, as already observed, is to itself 
— is the promotion and conservation of 
its own interests. Its position as an ac- 
tive member of the international family 
does not require it ever to lose sight of 
that principle. But, just weight being 
given to that principle, and its abilities 
and resources and opportunities permit- 
ting, there is no reason why the United 
States should not act for the relief of 
suffering humanity and for the advance- 
ment of civilization wherever and when- 
ever such action would be timely and 
effective. Should there, for example, be 
a recurrence of the Turkisli massacres 
of Armenian Christians, not to stop 
them alone or in concert with others, 
could we do so without imperiling our 



Groioth of our Foreign Policy. 



11 



own substantial interests, would be un- 
worthy of us and inconsistent with our 
claims and aspirations as a great Power. 
We certainly could no longer shelter 
ourselves behind the time-honored ex- 
cuse that we are an American Power 
exclusively, without concern with the 
affairs of the world at large. 

On similar grounds, the position we 
have assumed in the world and mean to 
maintain justifies us in undertaking to 
influence and enables us to greatly influ- 
ence the industrial development of the 
American people. The '• home market " 
fallacy disappears with the proved inad- 
equacy of the home market. Nothing 
will satisfy us in the future but free ac- 
cess to foreign markets — especially to 
those markets in the East now for the 
first time beginning to fully open them- 
selves to the Western nations. Hither- 
to, in introducing his wares and in seek- 
ing commercial opportunities of any sort 
in foreign countries, the American citi- 
zen has necessarily relied almost alto- 
gether upon his own unaided talents, 
tact, and enterprise. The United States 
as a whole has counted for little, if any- 
thing, in his favor — our notorious pol- 
icy of isolation, commercial and political, 
together with our notorious unreadiness 
for any exertion of our strength, divest- 
ing the government of all real prestige. 
In the markets of the Orient especial- 
ly, American citizens have always been 
at a decided disadvantage as compared 
with tliose of the great European Pow- 
ers. The latter impress themselves upon 
the native imagination by their display 
of warlike resources and their willing- 
ness to use them in aid not merely of the 
legal rights of their citizens but in many 
cases of their desires and ambitions as 
well. If the native government itself is 
in the market, it of course prefers to 
trade with the citizen of a Power in 
whose prowess it believes and whose 
friendship it may thus hope to obtain. 
If its subjects are the traders, they are 
affected bv the same considerations as 



their government and naturally follow 
its lead in their views and tiieir prefer- 
ences. Obstacles of this sort to the ex- 
tension of American trade^jjan-not but 
be greatly lessened in the future under 
the operation of the new foreign policy 
of the United States and its inevitable 
accompaniments. Our new interest in 
foreign markets can not fail to be recog- 
nized. Our claim to equal opportunities 
for our citizens and to exemption from 
unfriendly discrimination against them, 
will hardly be ignored if known to be 
backed by a present readiness and abili- 
ty to make it good. " To be weak is 
miserable " an(<> to seem weak, however 
strong in rea-t^y, often comes to about 
the same thing. Our diplomatic repre- 
sentatives, no matter how certain of the 
greatness of their country, have hitherto 
labored under the difficulty that nations 
to whom they were accredited, especial- 
ly the Oriental nations, were not appre- 
ciative of the fact. That difficulty is 
unlikely to embarrass them in the fu- 
ture. They will, like the nation itself, 
cease to be isolated and of small con- 
sideration, and will speak and act with 
something of the same persuasiveness 
and authority as the representatives of 
European Powers. 

Along with the Monroe doctrine and 
non-interference in the intex-nal concerns 
of European states — rules of policy 
which generally speaking will stand un- 
affected — has gone another which our 
changed international attitude will un- 
doubtedly tend to modify. It has here- 
tofore been considered that anything 
like an alliance between the United 
States and an European Power, for any 
purpose or any time, was something not 
to be thought of. To give a thing a 
bad name, however undeservedly, is to 
do much to discredit it, and there is no 
doubt that the epithet " entangling " — 
almost invariably applied — has con- 
ti'ibuted largely to make " alliances " 
popularly and politically odious. Yet 
there may be *' alliances " which are not 



12 



Growth of our Foreign Policy. 



" entangling " but wholly advantageous, 
and without the French alliance, Amer- 
ican independence, if nut prevented, 
might have been long postponed. It 
has been a jjrevalent notion that Wash- 
ington was inimical to all alliances as 
such and left on recoi-d a solemn warn- 
ing to his countrymen against them. 
Yet Washington clearly discriminated 
between alliances that would entangle 
and those that would not, and between 
alliances that were permanent and those 
that were temporary. Justly construed, 
Washington's utterances are as wise to- 
day as when they were made and are 
no more applicable to tl'ei United States 
than to any other natioW It must be 
the policy of every state to avoid alli- 
ances that entangle, while temporary 
and limited are better than general and 
permanent alliances because friends and 
^lartners should be chosen in view of 
actually existing exigencies rather than 
in reliance upon doubtful forecasts of 
the uncertain future. Nevertheless, up 
to this time the theory and practice of 
the United States have been against all 
alliances peremptorily, and, were the 
Philippines not on our hands, might 
perhaps have been persisted in for a 
longer or shorter period. Whether they 
could have been or not is a contingen- 
cy not worth discussing. We start our 
career as a world Power with the Phil- 
ippine handicap firmly fastened to us, 
and that situation being accepted, how 
about " alliances " ? The true, the 
ideal position for us, would be complete 
freedom of action, perfect liberty to 
pick allies from time to time as special 
occasions might warrant and an enlight- 
ened view of our own interests might 
dictate. Without the Philippines, we 
might closely approach that position. 
With them, not merely is our need of 
friendship imperative, but it is a need 
which only one of the great Powers can 
satisfy or is disposed to satisfy. Ex- 
cept for Great Britain's countenance, 
we should almost certainly never have 



got the Philippines — except for her 
continued support, our hold upon them 
would be likely to prove precarious, 
perhaps altogether unstable. It follows 
that we now find ourselves actually 
caught in an entangling alliance, forced 
there not by any treaty, or compact of 
any sort, formal or informal, but by the 
stress of the inexorable facts of the 
situation. It is an alliance that en- 
tangles because we might be and should 
be friends with all the world and be- 
cause our necessary intimacy with and 
dependence upon one of them is certain 
to excite the suspicion and ill-will of 
other nations. Still, however much bet- 
ter off we might have been, regrets, the 
irrevocable having happened, are often 
worse than useless, and it is much more 
jirofitable to note such compensatory 
advantages as the actual situation offers. 
In that view, it is consoling to reflect 
that, if we must single out an ally from 
among the nations at the cost of alien- 
ating all others, and consequently have 
thrown ourselves into the arms of Eng- 
land, our choice is probably unexcej> 
tionable. We join ourselves to that one 
of the great Powers most formidable as 
a foe and most effective as a friend ; 
whose people make with our own but one 
family, whose internal differences should 
not prevent a united front as against the 
world outside ; whose influence upon the 
material and spiritual conditions of the 
human race has on the whole been ele- 
vating and beneficent ; and whose exam- 
ple and experience can not help being of 
the utmost service in our dealing with 
the difficult problems before us. 

In undertaking any forecast of the fu- 
ture of our foreign relations, it is mani- 
festly impracticable to attempt more 
than to note certain leading principles 
which, it would seem, must inevitably 
govern the policy of the United States. 
It is not rash to affirm in addition, how- 
ever, that a consequence of the new in- 
ternational position of the United States 
nuist be to jjive to foreign affairs a mea- 



Groivth of our Foreign Policy. 



13 



sure of popular interest and importance 
far beyond what they have hitlierto en- 
joyed. Domestic affairs will cease to be 
regarded as alone deserving the serious 
attention of Americans generally, who, 
in their characters, intei'ests, and sympa- 
thies can not fail to respond to the mo- 
mentous change which has come to the 
nation at large. ^ Such a change will im- 
port no decline of patriotism, no lessen- 
ing of the loyalty justly expected of every 



man to the country of his nativity or 
adoption. But it will import, if not for 
us, for coming generations, a larger know- 
ledge of the earth and its diverse peo- 
ples ; a familiarity with problems world- 
wide in their bearings ; the abatement 
of racial prejudices ; in short, such en- 
larged mental and moral vision as is 
ascribed to the Roman citizen in the 
memorable saying that, being a man, no- 
thing human was foreign to him. 

Richard Olney. 



I 



fifl 

011 560 10=' 



I 



